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“The government of  Iran has invited us and provided necessary conditions for our 
work. We must do our best in helping the growing generation in Iran to comprehend 
the wholesome ideas of  freedom and democracy and the dignity of  the individual, 
thereby preventing them from going to the mullahs to learn Islam which bars the 
country from modern life.”1 
After World War II, the United States began providing extensive 
foreign aid to many nations throughout the world. As the US grew as 
a world power, it abandoned the isolationist practices that had been in 
place during the interwar period. The US directed assistance to those 
in need of  financial and technical aid—nations ravaged by World War 
II, as well as less-developed nations striving for social and economic 
advancement. In order to maintain “world order,” secure necessary 
resources, covertly fight the Cold War, and push the developing Third 
World continuously forward, the US was more determined than ever 
to have a worldwide presence. It was the “innate American ability to 
get things done” that would make it happen.2 
Iran featured prominently in the American government’s postwar 
plans.  Due to the Soviet Union’s close proximity, the United States 
sought to keep a stronghold on capitalism in the region and build a 
strong ally of  Iran. After all, Iran was one of  two American allied 
countries bordering the Soviet Union.3 Iran was also of  interest to 
the United States because of  its natural resources; for much of  the 
twentieth century, Iran held the largest oil refinery in the world.4 
For these reasons, the United States became heavily invested in Iran 
militarily, politically, and economically. Through broadly defined terms 
of  economic assistance, military assistance, sales and grants of  surplus 
agricultural commodities, and miscellaneous expenditures, the U.S. 
invested over $1.6 billion in Iran from 1950 to 1965. Approximately 
$118 million of  that investment was allocated to social aid measures, 
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which were “designed to promote the freedom, independence and 
growth of  Iran.”5 
This article will consider American aid given to Iran, as well as the 
reasons and ways in which Iran welcomed this aid. It will address the 
accomplishments and shortcomings of  the programs, the role aid 
played in the greater scheme of  international politics within the realm 
of  the Cold War, and what lasting impression these public diplomacy 
programs had on Iran. This article will focus on three particular 
public diplomacy programs: Point Four, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and the Peace Corps. 
With President Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address promising 
to extend technical aid to developing countries, Iran became the first 
country to reap the benefits of  the public diplomacy program known 
as Point Four. “If  through Point Four we can give people a sense of  
confidence in their own power to build better lives for themselves,” 
one Point Four official asserted, “they won’t pay much attention to 
the communist agitators.”6 This initial agreement laid the groundwork 
for future social aid programs to Iran, as well as extensive military 
assistance and economic loans. USAID, a subset of  Point Four and 
the International Cooperation Administration of  the 1950s, was 
enacted in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy’s executive order. 
USAID expanded the American presence in Iran and, according to 
USAID officials, made substantial progress in Iran until 1966 when 
economic aid programs to Iran were concluded. The Peace Corps, also 
established in 1961, was a new kind of  public diplomacy initiative that 
placed young Americans, frequently college graduates, on the ground 
where they contributed to social development projects. Between 1961 
and 1976, the Peace Corps sent over 2,000 young Americans to Iran, 
where they worked at the “grass roots” level. The Peace Corps came 
to play a significant role in cultural diplomacy against the backdrop of  
the Cold War. 
The source base for this study is extensive and draws upon American 
government documents from the National Archives in Washington, 
D.C.; USAID online archives; Iranian government documents from 
the Center for History and Diplomacy in Tehran, Iran; American and 
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Iranian newspapers from the time period, as well as interviews with 
returned Peace Corps volunteers who served in Iran. Because many 
relevant documents at the National Archives remain classified, the 
work cited in this article must limit itself  to what was available in 2011. 
tHe CLose of worLd wAr ii And tHe Journey to intensified us-
irAniAn reLAtions
To understand the intensity of  U.S.-Iranian relations during this 
period, it is important to note Iran’s past relations with Western 
powers as well as ambitions for the future. Iran’s tense relations with 
the Soviet Union and Britain since the early 20th century predisposed it 
to welcome the United States as a possible neutral third party. 
During World War II, American, British, and Soviet forces occupied 
Iran to assure stability and success in the war. In 1941, the Allied 
Powers forced Iran’s head of  state, Reza Pahlavi Shah, to abdicate his 
throne in favor of  his young son, Mohammad Reza Shah, after Reza 
Shah refused to expel German nationals from Iran. Among the three 
countries, the British and Soviets had an especially vested interest in 
Iran because of  the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) as well as 
the oil concessions arranged with the Soviet Union. British forces, 
protecting the interests of  APOC, occupied the southern region of  
Iran while the Soviets occupied in the north. British powers were 
concerned with Iranian domestic issues insofar as oil interests were 
affected. For example, in July 1946 when oil workers went on strike to 
protest poor working conditions, the British responded by positioning 
battleships off  the coast of  Abadan. The Soviets, on the other hand, 
were more intent on absorbing Iran and its resource-rich lands into 
Soviet territories, or at least into its sphere of  influence. Because such 
formidable world powers were pursuing oil supplies and occupying 
extensive portions of  Iran, in addition to the WWII occupation, Iran 
feared manipulation by foreign powers. 
Mohammad Reza Shah, second in the Pahlavi Dynasty who ascended 
the throne at the age of  twenty-one, faced relative political instability in 
his reign.7  He felt threatened by the encroachment of  British and Soviet 
powers in domestic affairs, and feared Iran’s future was in jeopardy if  
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With American-imported engineers and technicians, bridges 
were constructed where there were none; this bridged was 
erected with village and tribal labor that would enable easier 
transportation. Source: USAID archives, “Highlights of  the 
Aid Program in Iran,” (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PDACQ758.pdf).
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calculated autonomy was not established. The Shah’s strategy to reach 
such autonomy was through an alliance with the United States. The 
Shah welcomed the United States with open arms and aggressively 
pursued American aid. In fact, virtually no international aid program 
in Iran began without an invitation from the Middle Eastern country. 
Multiple aid request rejections did not deter Prime Minster Qavam 
and the Shah’s determination to improve Iran’s economy and world 
status by way of  the United States. As a gesture, Iran contracted out to 
American Overseas Consults, Inc, a large and prestigious engineering 
firm frequently hired by the American government. On February 15, 
1949 the Majlis, Iran’s legislative body, enacted into law the resulting 
Seven Year Development Plan.8 The Plan detailed a wide variety 
of  economic and development projects ranging from expanding 
production, increasing exports, and developing agriculture to improving 
public health and education. The Shah and Iranian legislatures hoped 
this plan would communicate enthusiasm for modernization. thereby 
prompting American aid in return. In any case, the projects and 
improvements outlined in the consultants’ reports called for measures 
that Iran’s national budget could not afford; actual implementation 
required outside funding. 
In 1949, a hopeful Shah visited the United States by invitation of  
President Truman, but returned home disappointed after the trip 
produced no substantial agreement of  aid to Iran. In the book he 
later wrote in 1962, reflecting on Iran’s American-bolstered post-
war progress towards modernity, he commented on his meeting with 
Truman and the state of  Iran after not receiving aid. “Such a serious 
setback to our hopes convinced many of  my people that the United 
States had deserted them, and anti-American sentiment developed, 
with a corresponding strengthening of  the National Front party9.”10 
There was validity to the Shah’s statements: Iran’s political and 
economic instability during this period was evident. After an upsurge 
of  Iran’s communist Tudeh Party in the Azerbaijan region, northwest 
Iran, Qavam sought to ease Tudeh and Soviet pressures with American 
aid. Iran was also overwhelmed with political chaos in the years before 
aid; on February 4, 1949, the Shah survived an assassination attempt 
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at Tehran University, and on November 4 of  that year Prime Minister 
Abdul Hussein Hazhir was assassinated. With the state of  the nation’s 
economy, shaky political position, and proximity to the Soviet Union, 
Iranian leaders believed that Britain or the Soviet Union would seize 
power in Iran. Qavam and the Shah sought to alleviate Iran’s political 
and economic struggles with American aid, wholly believing that US 
aid would not only usher in a strong western alliance and subdue the 
Soviet Union, but would also result in a more pronounced and higher 
global standing through American-promoted national security.
The greatest challenge Iran faced after WWII was national security. 
The evacuation of  Soviet troops and the collapse of  the Azeri and 
Kurdish rebel regimes did not resolve the problem of  national 
autonomy. After the highly publicized evacuation of  Soviet troops 
from Iran, Soviet-supported Azeri and Kurdish rebel regimes surged 
in the North. Prime Minister Qavam and the Shah, backed by the 
U.S., intended to free Azerbaijan of  the rebel occupation, but before 
an attack could be made both separatist regimes crumbled due to 
internal contention as well as the military threat posed by Tehran. 
Incessant Soviet pressures simply reinforced the thinking that Iran 
must be preserved by every possible means, and that American aid was 
imperative. Although Iran was an unindustrialized, under-developed 
nation with many social handicaps, to some leaders, such as the Shah, 
socioeconomic betterment of  the country was subordinate to the 
necessity of  a stable and autonomous state that could defend itself. 
“The most basic of  human needs is a peaceful, secure environment so 
that men can develop themselves and their country,” the Shah asserted 
in his 1962 book. “In a sense this need is even more fundamental 
than that for food and shelter, for security constitutes the essential 
prerequisite for producing enough food and shelter.”11 
Needless to say, not all felt this way. “Why should a poor nation such 
as ours that has gone through years of  poverty be armed to defend the 
selfish interests of  the millionaires of  America and England? This is 
the story of  the wolf  and the lamb. Why doesn’t the United States give 
us aid to help us improve our education, agriculture, and health?” one 
journalist wrote in Iran’s Kayhan Times. “This is a $10 million baited trap 
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that we must jump away from.”12 Given Iran’s monarchy and high rates 
of  illiteracy, the population was not represented in government and 
the actions of  policy-makers and leaders were by no means indicative 
of  national sentiment. Affluent leaders of  Iran sought immediate aid 
from the U.S., not to raise the standard of  living, but to establish a 
modern industrialized country with a military that could avert the 
threat of  foreigners. Despite the criticisms of  some, many Iranian 
leaders believed that, given the circumstances and what was at stake in 
their relationship with the United States, the benefits of  economic and 
military aid outweighed any foreseeable costs.
Although many political analysts in Washington were convinced 
that Iran’s security was an important US interest because of  Iran’s oil 
resources and strategic location, few wanted to prioritize Iran over 
Western Europe in the postwar years. Iran had to wait until the early 
1950s, when the Marshall Plan was discontinued and aid to Western 
Europe was dramatically reduced after American policy makers 
assessed Europe no longer needed aid. With the intensification of  
the Cold War and introduction of  containment measures, American 
concepts of  security were broadened and policy makers looked to the 
Middle East for a powerful ally in the region, such as Iran. “The issues 
at stake in Iran go far beyond the question of  oil. We can be sure that 
the Kremlin is losing no opportunity to fish in the troubled water of  
Iran, for Iran would be a great and strategic prize quite apart from oil,” 
George McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian 
and African Affairs, stated. “Control of  Iran, an area approximately as 
large as the United States east of  the Mississippi River, would put the 
Soviet Union astride the communication routes connecting the free 
nations of  Asia and Europe.”13 
point four, usAid, And CoLd wAr poLitiCs
After the US cleared a $25 million line of  credit to Iran on September 
23, 1950, American Ambassador Henry F. Grady communicated to 
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Maraghei that Point Four was to 
be on the table soon enough, and not a moment too soon for Iranians. 
On October 19 of  that year, with the signing of  a “Memorandum 
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of  Understanding,” Iran became the first country to take advantage 
of  the newly enacted Point Four Technical Assistance Administration 
within the State Department. 
How did public diplomacy programs exist institutionally both in Iran 
and the US and what did they intend to do? Were the organizations 
dedicated to the humanitarian cause for the sake of  the cause, or more 
to portray an image of  a strong Western-oriented relationship? The 
purpose of  such cultural diplomacy in Iran was to foster a positive 
image of  the United States despite international policy geared toward 
economics and politics, and to transform Iran into the modern state 
that would prove a valuable ally in the region. But was such aid a form 
of  cultural hegemony? What impact did multi-million dollar projects 
and thousands of  Americans sprawled across Iran for the humanitarian 
cause actually make? 
Initially named the Technical Cooperation Administration for Iran 
and renamed the United States Operation Mission to Iran (or simply 
the “Mission”), the program in Iran existed under the International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA). In order to collaborate goals and 
projects as well as determine the financing of  social aid programs, the 
two countries established the Iranian-United States Joint Commission 
on Rural Improvement. “Economic aid to Iran has been a mutual 
assistance undertaking. For the most part the U.S. has provided 
necessary foreign exchange and technical skills,” one aid official 
wrote in 1954. “The government of  Iran has provided local currency, 
contributions in kind and a cadre of  dynamic men and women 
interested in matching Iran’s ancient and illustrious past with a modern 
and progressive future.”14 
At the outset, Iran received no more than $500,000 in Point Four funds 
for the first fiscal year. Historians dispute the reasons that prompted 
Washington to extend this Point Four initiative. At the time the United 
States began aiding Iran through Point Four, the economic gains were 
not sufficient to justify the cost of  the program to the American 
taxpayer. Iran’s trade with the United States at the time constituted 
a very insignificant part of  the total American foreign commerce. 
As for oil, the American government seemed more concerned with 
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keeping the Iranian petroleum resources out of  Soviet hands than with 
developing technology and extracting oil. 
Officially, American objectives in Iran focused on raising the standard 
of  living and helping Iranians help themselves.15 Point Four sought 
to decrease high illiteracy levels, erase the prevalence of  preventable 
diseases and raise the standard of  health, as well as increase high 
quality industrial and agricultural production.  Economic development 
was considered desirable for its expected political stability, rise in the 
national level of  living, and resistance to the danger of  communism. 
The Point Four strategy was that the improvement of  living conditions 
in Iran would thwart communism at the grass roots level. 
After close examination, it is clear that the initiation of  Point Four 
funds to Iran directly correlated with the growth of  the communist 
Tudeh Party, strongest in north Iran near influential neighboring 
communist states, the Soviet Union and Azerbaijan. So strong in fact that 
from 1941-1953 Iran had the largest and most disciplined communist 
party in the Middle East.16 The US saw communism as such a growing 
threat that beginning in the late 1940s the CIA annually directed $1 
million to produce a propaganda machine in Iran. All forms of  media 
were manipulated in which the CIA “portrayed the Soviet Union and 
the Tudeh as anti-Iranian or anti-Islamic, described the harsh reality 
of  life in the Soviet Union, or explained the Tudeh’s close relationship 
with the Soviets and its popular-front strategy.”17 CIA agents were also 
said to have broken up Tudeh Party rallies and even instigated violent 
acts, which the communist party would be blamed for.18 
At a time when the Tudeh Party was soaring, Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadegh was elected in 1951 on a liberal platform calling 
for the nationalization of  the oil industry.19 This nationalistic initiative, 
however, did not bode well with Western interests. This was a time 
when many American analysts were unable to distinguish nationalism 
from communism. Because the security of  British oil equity in Iran 
was in the best interest of  the Western world, it was an opportunity for 
Washington to showcase its super-power capabilities. The perceived 
threat of  a communist take over coupled with the outrage of  the 
APOC, who stood to lose the most, was the motivation behind the 
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CIA’s first coup d’état of  a foreign democratically elected leader, at 
the cool price of  $19 million.20 The United States did not consider 
just how much this action would affect Iran’s national psychology and 
democratic process. After the coup, the Majlis never operated in the 
same way again—in fact, there were periods when the congressional 
body didn’t operate at all; such as from 1961-1963, when the autocratic 
Shah shut down Majlis entirely. Given the pressures within Iranian 
politics, the 1950 Point Four allotment of  $500,000 was increased to 
$23.4 million by 1952.21 That Iran received the largest share of  Point 
Four funds between 1950 and 1953, when the Tudeh Party was so 
strong and the liberal Prime Minister Mossadegh was in power, was no 
coincidence.22
When the Mission entered Iran, it had a variety of  systematic issues 
to address, and many obstacles to overcome. One report detailed the 
state of  disrepair in Iran:
“With approximately 17 million inhabitants, a birth rate 
estimated at less than 2 percent per year, and a per capita income 
estimated at less than $100 per year, the population was about 
85 percent rural and grossly handicapped by a maze of  highly 
interrelated problems. The vast majority of  the population 
lived in an environment of  illiteracy with an inadequate and, in 
many cases, nonexistent system of  schools, an underdeveloped 
system of  roads and other means of  communication, poor 
sanitation and health, low level of  production methods and 
practices of  farming and forestry, inadequate and unsafe 
drinking water, inadequate water for irrigation and general 
insecurity.”23 
In order to address all these issues, American aid officials frequently 
referred to the expertise of  professionals in American universities, 
technical firms and commercial contractors to complete projects in 
Iran.24 
The projects surrounding public health focused on both immediate 
improvement of  health and sanitation in Iran as well as increased 
86     Sara Ehsani-Nia 
“Go Forth and Do Good”
Mobile tent schools were established in several of  Iran’s largest 
tribes, bringing literacy to the nomadic peoples of  Iran. Source: 
USAID archives, “Highlights of  the Aid Program in Iran,” 
(http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ758.pdf).
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accessibility. Public health sector activities included the establishment 
of  public health facilities, health centers and laboratories, mobile health 
unites, environmental sanitation, health education, and advancement 
of  medical and nursing schools.25 Disease control became public 
health’s largest and most impressive accomplishment. Prior to Point 
Four in Iran, health standards were dire; according to the Mission, Iran 
had an infant mortality rate of  50%, life expectancy of  30 years, and a 
variety of  preventable diseases reeking havoc.26 
When American health workers entered Iran in 1951, officials 
reported that those living in rural villages did not know bacteria or 
mosquitoes spread malaria. Prior to 1950, 80% of  Iran’s population 
lived in malaria-infested areas, with rates of  infection reaching 90% 
in some villages during the summer months.27 With the efforts of  
the U.S. Public Health team, paired with the Iranian Department of  
Public Health and the World Health Organization, trained malaria 
spray teams went to rural areas. According to the Mission’s reports, 
in just four years the incidence of  malaria decreased from 90% to 
less than 1%. An additional result of  this measure was the expansion 
of  cultivable land. National campaigns against major diseases, such 
as malaria and smallpox, as well as the importance of  clean water 
had led to significant reduction in the death rate and a substantial 
increase in effective manpower; surveys suggested that this reduction 
in disease increased the effective manpower rate by as much as 400%.28 
Before the Mission’s DDT malaria spraying, three-quarters of  infants 
contracted malaria within their first year of  life; that staggering statistic 
was reduced to zero in just a few months.29
According to the Mission, the public health efforts made some 
lasting contributions to healthier living practices in rural areas. After 
initial DDT sprayings by American professionals, locals in rural areas 
were quick to learn and were able to complete the task themselves. 
Iranian men and women coping with malaria since childhood could 
not imagine life without it.  One farmer pulled aside a Mission worker 
after the results were clear, and told him: “We were dead, and now we 
are alive.”30 People were suffering and dying from preventable diseases, 
such as malaria, for lack of  medicine and lack of  physicians. Malaria 
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had been an immense problem in Iran, and the eradication of  that 
issue was America’s greatest contribution to Iran’s “greater good” as 
the Mission worked with Iran’s Ministry of  Health to achieve short-
term as well as long-term goals of  a more health-educated and health-
conscious society. 
Other public health initiatives included mobile health units, which 
occasionally journeyed through provinces and rural areas of  Iran, and 
educational health-oriented films. American technicians from Syracuse 
University worked a training program in Iran to produce 80 educational 
films from 1952-1957.31 The team used local people as actors to make 
health educational films on proper sanitation in the home and with 
livestock, on the training of  midwives, on bacteria, on malaria, and 
other prevalent preventative diseases in Iran. 
In the field of  education, the Mission sought to establish additional 
school facilities, more and better trained teachers, improved reading 
material, and a modern curriculum. The Mission repaired existing 
schools and built schools where there were none. It stocked educational 
supplies such as books, pamphlets, maps, and charts in every 
classroom. When US aid forces entered the country, Iran’s greatest 
social problem was cripplingly high illiteracy, plaguing approximately 
85% of  the population, therefore it was the program’s main focus.32 
One source claims illiteracy was as high as 90% in 1949.33 Point Four’s 
most extensive educational program was in Iran.34 
American aid workers organized intensive teacher trainings. Between 
1950 and 1956 the number of  public schools in Iran doubled and the 
number of  teachers in elementary and high school increased from 
17,000 to 36,000.35 From 1952 to 1961 nearly 33,000 teachers were 
introduced to the Mission’s summer school teacher training plan. In 
1956 the Ministry of  Education took responsibility for the teacher-
training program, but American professionals continued serving 
as advisors.36 Iran’s school curriculum was also subject to change. 
The Mission and the Ministry of  Education fundamentally altered 
the curriculum to reflect the priorities of  a modern day education, 
modeled after the American public school system.37 The curriculum’s 
focus shifted to include vocational training, an emphasis on science, as 
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well as physical and health education. 
In 1950 Iran had approximately two million nomadic peoples, 
composed of  six major tribes.38 Both the Mission and the Iranian 
government wanted to bring education and literacy to these tribes 
without altering their way of  life. In 1953 the Mission worked 
resourcefully with the Ministry of  Education to assist in educating 
tribal children through the implementation of  tent schools that moved 
with the tribes and their flocks. After much discussion, tribal leaders 
agreed to select several hundred bright young men from within their 
tribes, all whom had reached at least sixth grade, to undergo training 
and return as teachers. In the summer of  1953, while the young men 
were taking part in an intensive six-week teacher training program, 
the Mission distributed all of  the necessary supplies to tribes: tents, 
portable lap desks, text books, blackboards, pencils, crayons, as well as 
volleyball nets and other playground equipment. The teacher training 
was focused on reading, writing, arithmetic, and physical education. 
Literacy was the main objective. 
The idea was to educate and train members of  various tribal 
communities, for as long as time would allow, and return them to their 
tribes where they could educate the children. Although some tribesmen 
were hesitant about the educational program’s entrance into their 
community, seven months into the program Mission officials reported 
great enthusiasm for the project throughout the communities as well 
as great pupil progress. Tribesmen expressed so much interest that one 
chief  insisted the school be held seven days a week for eight hours 
a day, instead of  following the normal school schedule. The Mission 
saw remarkable results; in less than a year, reports claimed over 12,000 
students enrolled in 375 such schools and over 1,000 children were 
able to read and write as a result of  the Mission’s tribal schools.39 
With this initial success, the Mission expanded the tribal educational 
foundation to include practical work in livestock and agriculture as well 
as health education. This was significant considering some tribal areas 
had recently lost 60% of  their livestock to disease in a single season.40 
By training teachers to educate tribal communities in proper sanitation 
practices, disease control measures, and safe methods of  first aid and 
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emergency treatment, common systematic diseases in participating 
tribes became preventable. According to Point Four reports, tribes not 
only met these educational initiatives with great enthusiasm, but also 
received requests from chiefs for an increase in school facilities for the 
children. 
Beside the Mission’s educational pursuits, another promising 
academic opportunity presented itself  at the Shah’s request.  In 
summer of  1958, during his visit to Washington, the Shah expressed 
great interest in creating an American-style university in Iran while 
meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In a letter from 
Iranian Ambassador Dr Ali Gholi Ardalan to Vice President Nixon, 
the ambassador reiterated the Shah’s sentiments. “An American-style 
University situated in southern Iran would afford so many advantages 
and be of  such great benefit to both our countries…to be successful, 
however, an American-type university must not only be guided by, 
but also directed by, American educators.”41 It was at this request that 
the State Department organized an exploratory expedition through 
Iran, and chose President Gaylord Harnwell of  the University of  
Pennsylvania to lead the tour. After reporting on the feasibility of  
establishing an American-style university in Iran, Harnwell and the 
University of  Pennsylvania played a significant role in launching 
Pahlavi University in the southern city of  Shiraz.42 This series of  
events resulted in the subsequent friendship of  Harnwell and the 
Shah, culminating in the Shah’s trip to the universoty in 1962 in which 
he was granted an honorary law degree. 
Beyond its benign manifestations of  aid, such as education, 
agriculture and health, the Mission also became involved in more 
controversial areas. A division of  Point Four in Iran was police and 
military training, ensuring that “officers have received special riot 
training to enable them to control rebellion.”43 But how did military 
and police training fit under Point Four’s supposed mission of  technical 
assistance to underdeveloped countries? The aid program claimed to 
champion the elimination of  handicaps in underdeveloped areas of  
the world: eradicating preventable diseases, as well as bringing literacy 
and sustainable agricultural practices to rural areas. How was the US 
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After Point Four entered Iran, vaccinations became free and 
accessible to millions of  Iranians every year. Source: USAID 
archives, “Highlights of  the Aid Program in Iran,” (http://pdf.
usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ758.pdf).
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justifying the bolstering of  the Iranian police force as a tenet of  Point 
Four? Despite this, the Mission received adequate endorsement of  the 
controversial plan by Point Four officials and members of  Congress, 
evident in their approval of  American “social aid” applied to a national 
police force that was already notorious for oppressing the Iranian 
people. Militant and police strengthening under Point Four was a 
misappropriation of  taxpayer dollars, and an area in which Point Four 
exclusively pushed its agenda in favor of  American interests.  In any 
case, the United States had controversies of  its own in the realm of  
law enforcement during this period. After all, it was American police 
that unleashed fire hoses and dogs on peaceful protestors and children 
in Birmingham and college campuses across the nation in the 50s and 
60s. 
Once the US extended Point Four funds and other forms of  aid to 
Iran, relations between the two countries deepened. In 1955 Iran entered 
the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO), which was established by the United States and Britain to 
keep Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq safely in the Western sphere as a 
bulwark against communism. This move marked a period of  increased 
tension between Iran and the Soviet Union. For the next seven years 
the Soviet Union launched vicious propaganda campaigns against 
the Shah and the Iranian government. Tensions eased in September 
1962, when the Shah declared that foreign nuclear weapons were not 
to be stationed in Iran.44 Afterwards, Iran began a technical assistance 
program, and a trading agreement with the Soviet Union, keeping with 
its habit of  requesting and receiving aid wherever it could.45 
In 1961, the United States Agency for International Aid was 
established under the Kennedy administration. For Iran, USAID’s 
entrance simply continued the work of  Point Four. Although Iran 
was still receiving a substantial aid funding, the figures had steadily 
and subtly decreased since its heyday in the mid-1950s. For the years 
from 1946 to 1965, the American foreign assistance program reached 
a cumulative figure of  over $117 billion in aid to over 100 nations.46 
Included in this global figure was almost $1.6 billion provided to the 
Government of  Iran to finance mutually agreed upon economic and 
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military activities designed to promote the freedom, independence and 
growth of  Iran. By 1965, Point Four and USAID funds totaled in 
$118.4 million in US technical assistance to Iran.47 Areas of  technical 
assistance included agriculture, community development, education, 
health, industrial development, labor, public administration and public 
safety.  Beyond technical and social aid, Iran was receiving additional 
assistance from the United States. “Between 1953-57, the United States 
provided grants in excess of  $250 million, and loans totaling over $116 
million to assist the government of  Iran survive a period of  extreme 
economic instability,” stated one government report.48
From 1951 to 1965 several million Iranians were trained in the 
educational sector alone. By 1963, Iranian elementary schools had 
increased by 80%, teachers by 90% and enrollment by 120%.49 Perhaps 
this contributed to the Shah’s 1962 decision to replace French with 
English as Iran’s official second language. Technicians trained teachers 
in more effective ways of  educating, and altered the curriculum to 
better suit the job market. The number could, however, be even higher 
given that the teachers trained could have taught others as well. “Self-
reliance” projects, focused on helping Iranians to help themselves in 
various sectors, were spread to every Iranian village; by 1965, over 
70,000 projects were supposedly completed.50  Through conclusive 
reports, USAID reassured Congress and the American people that the 
billions of  aid dollars were used successfully, significantly improving 
the lives of  Iranians. 
tHe peACe Corps: devising AmeriCAn Aid At tHe grAss roots
“In the war of  ideas, a war for the minds and hearts of  the people, the victor 
will be those who have thoroughly studied the natives, in particular their psychology 
which is deeply influenced by an inferiority complex, widespread among the people 
of  Iran.”51
“How many of  you are willing to spend ten years in Africa or 
Latin America or Asia working for the United States and working for 
freedom? How many of  you who are going to be doctors are willing 
to spend your days in Ghana? Technicians or engineers, how many of  
you are willing to work in the Foreign Service and spend your lives 
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traveling around the world? On your willingness to do that, not merely 
to serve one year or two years in the service, but on your willingness 
to contribute part of  your life to this country, I think will depend the 
answer whether a free society can compete.”52 These were the words 
of  John F. Kennedy in 1960, challenging the students of  the University 
of  Michigan to do great things, and what many believe was Kennedy’s 
first proposal of  the Peace Corps. By the end of  the 1960s, over 
22,000 volunteers traveled the world, representing the United States 
in underdeveloped countries, and achieving the goals of  the Peace 
Corps.53 
The Peace Corps was an agenda-driven grassroots form of  foreign 
policy, which recruited young, frequently college-educated, well-
intentioned American volunteers who sought to make a positive 
difference in the world. After language and skill training in the United 
States, volunteers served two years in an underdeveloped country 
working in agriculture, industry, education, and health. 54 Peace Corps 
leaders envisioned this form of  public diplomacy not to be categorically 
economic, but rather a cultural exchange initiative from which the host 
country benefited. 
The Peace Corps was both an activity for students seeking public 
service, as well as beneficial to host communities. While Kennedy, 
a president focused on foreign policy, envisioned the Peace Corps 
fulfilling a multifaceted purpose, he had one primary intention. 
“Through the Peace Corps, Kennedy attempted to project a non-
opportunistic image and reinforce the perception of  other nations that 
the primary objective of  the United States towards the third world was 
not ‘to dominate’ but ‘to help.’”55 The Peace Corps was to fight the 
Cold War by using “culture-to-culture diplomacy to make friends in 
nations that had little inherent power but that could without warning 
become theaters of  the cold war.”56 It was a seemingly ingenious way 
to entice people at the grassroots level that the American way of  life 
was the best way, and show them the generosity of  the United States. 
Naturally, Iran requested Peace Corps services and the first group 
entered in 1962. From 1962-1976, more than 2,000 volunteers went to 
Iran to foster a positive image of  the United States.57 
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experienCes on tHe ground
There were volunteers in Iran who gained thoroughly positive 
experiences, as well as those more troubled by the politics at play. 
“Any country that has more than three varieties of  jam,” volunteer 
Michael Dereskewicz remembered thinking, “doesn’t need Peace 
Corps volunteers.”58 Jest aside, he was a true believer in the Peace 
Corps and international aid, and valued the personal relationships he 
cultivated with Iranians. Having had a positive experience, Dereskewicz 
considered his service a contribution to Iran’s greater good. In an 
interview, volunteer Jennifer Seaver echoed Dereskewicz’s nostalgia 
and assenting attitude, but added the obstacles she faced as a female 
volunteer in a country with more gender inequality the US.59 Volunteer 
Doug Schermer observed the tense power dynamic in Iran but that 
it did not play a large role in his service. “Of  course I was able to 
perceive that I was in a dictatorship and could feel the presence of  
SAVAK [Iran’s secret police, established by the CIA]. I was aware of  
the 1953 coup and suspected the worst when it came to the relations 
between the CIA and SAVAK. But these things were not part of  my 
daily experience.”
Some volunteers stationed in Iran, however, were a more cognizant 
of  the realities and paradoxes in US-Iranian relations, and sensed they 
were at the rungs of  the Cold War. “We were an exchange for tanks, we 
understood,” volunteer Ricks recalled.60 Through his experiences, Ricks 
sensed the hypocrisies in relations, such as the Shah’s prioritization of  
the military over social reform, which traced back to the negotiations 
for aid in the late 1940s. On the state of  Iran, Ricks remarked that “there 
was the Iran that benefited from the U.S.-Iranian puppet relationship, 
the technocrats, and there was the rural poor, the forgotten Iranians.”61 
Some Peace Corps volunteers were aware of  the American-backed 
systematic disenfranchisement of  Iranians. 
Besides the unnecessary and preventable struggles Peace Corps 
volunteers faced in Iran, such as poor language and misleading area 
studies training, volunteers had to win over locals with varying degrees 
of  prejudgments. Some Iranians were hesitant about the Peace 
Corps—alongside all aid programs to Iran—as it was a challenge to 
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Peace Corps members in Iran, circa 1974. Source: “Peace Corps 
Still Pictures,” at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
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their national sense of  self-worth, coupled with their general mistrust 
of  the US and the surface-level aid programs. Additionally, with the 
progressive efforts of  the Western-enthusiastic Shah, Iran in the 1960s 
was not as in-need of  such a program as other poverty-stricken nations 
in the world, and this played a role in Iranian hostility towards US aid. 
At a time when volunteers were being sent to more destitute areas of  
the globe, many thought of  the volunteers in Iran as unnecessary as 
Iran’s largest problem was illiteracy, not famine. 
Robert Burkhardt, an Iran 2 Project volunteer, recalled the comment 
of  the school principal where he was stationed to teach. “‘I welcome 
you to my country. I’m glad that you come to work with us and help 
us. But we don’t need you Americans. We tolerate you. You think you’re 
so goddamned superior but our culture is four thousand years old and 
yours is two hundred years old.”62
 “We got the impression we were golden boys and girls, clean-cut 
American youth, off  to the Near East to wreak great changes among 
the backward Iranians,” a Group 1 volunteer said. “When we got here, 
we found out we were assistants—and in most cases, to Iranians who 
were as good or better than most of  us.”63 
The discomfort some felt towards the presence of  Peace Corps 
volunteers was amplified by doubts of  the organization’s true intentions. 
Many Iranians were skeptical of  the presence of  American do-gooders, 
truly believing the Peace Corps was a conduit for CIA recruits. There 
was a general suspicion that the Peace Corps was covertly infiltrated 
with CIA spies; that the Corps was merely a platform for spying on 
Third World countries. At times, Peace Corps volunteers in Iran ran 
into trouble with local authorities; some were even detained, but usually 
for no longer than several days. After all, Iranians had good reason to 
mistrust the US. 
However, it was not just Iranian citizens that were suspicious of  
Peace Corps activity; the Iranian government, which had invited the 
Corps, was too. Volunteer Burkhart recalled being steadily watched 
by Iran’s secret police. “In every class I gave there would be an agent 
from the SAVAK sitting among the students.”64 This illustrates the 
Shah’s deep-rooted mistrust towards the US, as well as the scope 
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of  subversion. Would the spread of  idealistic Americans across the 
Iranian countryside lead to modernity or dissidence? 
The Soviet Union certainly suspected foul play in the Peace Corps. 
There were a number of  cases in which workers from Soviet embassies 
approached and bribed Peace Corps volunteers for information or 
documents. “In two cases overseas the Peace Corps discovered that 
the Russian embassy had rented space in offices immediately above 
or connected to Peace Corps offices with the obvious intention of  
eavesdropping.”65 In 1966, volunteer Thomas R. Dawson, stationed 
in Iran, was arrested and detained by Soviet forces. He had been 
traveling to his workshop site in Northern Iran and changed buses 
in the village of  Astara, where the shallow Aral River was the only 
marker of  the Iranian-Soviet border.66 Supposedly unbeknownst to 
Dawson, he waded into the river and upon reaching the other side he 
was apprehended by Soviet soldiers. After being transported to Baku, 
in Soviet Azerbaijan, he was held for three weeks before his release 
negotiations were successful.67 The moment of  his arrest, however, 
Iran had declared him persona non grata.68 Was he secretly a CIA 
agent or another American oblivious to the world map?
This stigma against the Peace Corps was a challenge that Director 
Shriver worked very hard to overcome. With strenuous and 
comprehensive background checks, the Peace Corps weeded out 
volunteers who had any history or past relation with the CIA. Returning 
volunteers were also prohibited from working for the CIA for a five-
year “cooling off  period.”69 Perhaps this was overcompensation on 
Shriver’s part; according to Peace Corps investigations, no volunteer 
had ever been exposed as an undercover CIA affiliate.70 
us Aid And tHe ConsoLidAtion of tHe pAHLAvi monArCHy
In 1966, the US Overseas Mission to Iran and Congress believed 
that obstacles had been overcome, goals had been reached, and 
progress had been made in Iran. USAID assumed that with apparent 
political and economic stability, Iran would be able to move forward 
successfully without continued American technical and social aid. But 
American aid officials also determined that with Iranian oil revenues 
reaching new heights, Iran had become economically capable of  
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undertaking all of  the financial responsibilities to continue the projects 
and progress made during the American aid tenure. In 1967 the US 
declared Iran a developed country.71 This marked a turning point in 
U.S.-Iranian relations; while direct aid was discontinued, American 
military assistance to Iran increased along side oil revenues.  By the 
early 1970s, Iran had the largest military in the Middle East.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs published a neatly put together 
pamphlet in 1966 as a conclusive bookend argument on USAID’s 
departure of  Iran. “Iran survived the troubled period of  the early 
1950s, grew steadily stronger throughout the late 1950s and early 
1960s, and is today enjoying political stability, economic growth, and 
social change unique to this part of  the world…the USAID Mission 
has been deeply involved in the work that has made this progress 
possible.”72 By 1966, literacy rates had been improved some from the 
20% figure existing when Point Four entered Iran. According to the 
national census of  1966, 40.1% of  males and 17.9% of  females of  six 
years or more were literate.73  
Despite claimed altruistic purposes, however, the missions of  Point 
Four and USAID held a large paradox. Washington tried to foster social 
progress in Third World countries, while simultaneously attempting to 
maintain the same status quo that enabled such a government, like the 
Shah’s regime, to prosper and continue. The American government 
was not prepared to advocate or support many reforms it had 
traditionally preached and was ideologically committed to promote. 
In an article in Conservation magazine, Stanely Cain commented on 
this very phenomenon. “It often seems that while trying to help the 
common man through our programs of  technical cooperation under 
Point Four and the like, we at the same time endeavor to preserve the 
status quo. We sometimes find ourselves in the incongruous role of  
helping the pot boil while trying to sit on the lid.”74 
Time and again, American government officials applauded the Shah 
for sharing the values of  freedom, democracy, and liberty in detailed 
government documents. But in truth, even if  Iran was becoming 
an increasingly progressive country with aspirations of  future social 
modernity, it did not have the foundation of  a democratic society. It 
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had a monarchy, an underrepresented population with a large disparity 
between rich and poor, and a puppet congress that depended on the 
Shah’s whim. The Shah’s Western-oriented leadership and government 
fulfilled American interests both geo-strategically and in oil resources, 
which was the ultimate goal of  public diplomacy efforts. It seems that 
neither the Shah’s brutal treatment of  civilians and fear tactics nor his 
pocketing of  aid dollars deterred the American projected image of  a 
noble and progressive Mohammad Reza Shah.
Point Four’s indisputable conceptual and functional contradictions 
are visible in the construction of  most projects. In an attempt to 
protect the political and strategic interests of  the United States, the 
program had to place its chief  emphasis on short-run, tactical and 
expedient maneuvers the results of  which could be immediately 
evident. “The objective of  the program in the early days,” one Mission 
official described in 1957, “was to keep the country on an even keel. 
We tried to keep influential people happy, in power, and friendly to us. 
We tried to do things that people seemed to like and felt were good 
for them.”75
This paradox also influenced the reach of  aid. We see that both 
American and Iranian interests shaped and hindered the way in 
which Point Four came to be in Iran.  Aid policy makers had to make 
concessions in project conception and direction in order to gain 
joint political support from the Iranian Majlis. Had the United States 
pressed Iran to make changes that would be unsettling to the Iranian 
government’s stability, Point Four would have no longer been welcome 
in Iran. 
Although Point Four and USAID documents may lead us to believe 
otherwise, by the early 1960s, many Iranian and American observers 
expressed doubt as to what was becoming of  aid dollars in Iran. 
Through the 1960s journalist Fred J. Cook wrote of  U.S.-Iranian covert 
affairs related to aid to Iran, all published in The Nation. “Do you know 
what the head of  the Iranian army told one of  our people?” Senator 
Hubert H. Humphrey remarked in 1961. “He said the army is now in 
good shape, thanks to U.S. aid—and it was now capable of  coping with 
the civilian population. That army isn’t planning to fight Russians. It’s 
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Point Four and USAID established Iran’s police college, which 
began training patrolmen in modern police methods. Officers 
were trained to enforce the Shah’s absolute power on every lev-
el of  society, a particularly controversial segment of  US aid ef-
forts in Iran. (USAID archives, “Highlights of  the Aid Program 
in Iran,” (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACQ758.pdf).
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planning to fight the Iranian people.”76 The Senator said what many 
were thinking: aid to Iran was being misappropriated, misused, and 
corrupted. The Senator could have been referring to the way the CIA 
had established Iran’s oppressive secret police, the SAVAK, or to the 
direct military aid from the US or perhaps he was referring to Point 
Four and USAID money being poured into “public safety” measures, 
and the ramping up of  the military and domestic police force.
In 1957 the Committee on Government Operations of  the House 
of  Representatives attempted to decipher what became of  some 
$250 million in economic aid given to Iran over the past few years, 
only to find that it had virtually vanished into thin air. “Our aid,” 
the Committee reported, “had been administered in such a loose, 
slipshod and unbusinesslike manner that it is now impossible—with 
any accuracy—to tell what became of  these funds.”77 The committee 
claimed that the poor administrative operation of  aid in Iran during 
the late 50s raised suspicions about the integrity of  the program’s 
functionality.
In October 1963, in the first session of  the 88th Congress, Senator 
Ernest Gruening submitted a report entitled “United States Foreign 
Aid in Ten Middle Eastern and African Countries,” for the Committee 
on Government Operations. Senator Gruening was very critical 
of  international aid specific to Iran. Recognizing the number of  
miscalculations, money frivolously wasted in between projects, and 
lacking enthusiasm from the Iranian counterparts, the Senator believed 
aid to Iran needed serious reevaluation. 
The year the investigation began, there were more than 5,000 
incomplete USAID projects. One reflection of  this pattern of  
inefficiency is exemplified in the circumstances surrounding a project 
signed in 1952, when it was to build and supply equipment for a cloth-
weaving factory. Seven years after it was established, since having 
received more than $4 million in grants and loans from the US, not a 
single report of  economic feasibility had been made, at which point 
the factory was producing grossly under capacity and hardly cutting 
even. In 1960 the matter was supposedly investigated in a report, but 
lacked sources of  or thoughtful solutions to the problems. In the case 
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of  a project signed in April 1952 to improve slaughterhouse facilities, 
the slaughterhouse never reached an operating status due to lack 
of  planning, shifting project direction, and contract disagreements. 
Senator Gruening’s study states that in 1964, twelve years after the 
agreement had been made, the slaughterhouse had not been opened 
yet, and not a single evaluation report had been drafted. 
This sort of  disorganization and inefficiency was rampant in Point 
Four’s Mission to Iran. “One wonders whether progress could not 
have been made faster in Iran if  the pace of  US aid had been slower, 
more carefully planned and, especially, with more desire on the part 
of  Iranians for particular development programs.” Iranian leaders’ 
reluctance to commit to social progress is evident in the time it took 
the for social reforms to be implemented. While Point Four had been 
in Iran for thirteen years, advocating modernization, the Shah’s White 
Revolution did not commence until the mid-60s.78 Given the Senator’s 
outlook on the inefficiency of  the aid implementation, he ultimately 
recommended that aid should continue and be concentrated on a 
smaller number of  projects, in support of  the Shah’s social reforms.79
In 1962, a scandal emerged linking the embezzlement of  USAID 
funds with high profile individuals. Allegedly, USAID dollars had 
been funneled into the Pahlavi Foundation, the Shah’s personal 
family fund, and used as bribe money towards Iranian, British, and 
American dignitaries. Khaibar Goodarzian “Khan,” a wealthy British-
educated Iranian businessman and exiled chief  of  a nomadic Iranian 
tribe, exposed this scheme; he was both a confidant to the Shah and a 
former member of  British military intelligence. Through an established 
network of  spies in the Imperial Palace complex, Khan reportedly 
broke into the Shah’s office safe on February 16, 1962. There, he found 
the set checks from 1962, totaling $29 million, linked to the Shah’s 
bank account in Switzerland. The ten checks were to be distributed 
on behalf  of  the Pahlavi Foundation to members of  the royal family 
as well as foreign personalities such as the American Ambassador to 
Iran Julius Holmes, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and financier David 
Rockefeller.80 With photostated checks, Khan testified before the 
McClellan Committee on Government Operations in 1963.81 
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“His [Khan’s] photostated records were checked with Treasury 
records on the dates of  aid payments to Iran and a comparison 
show that in repeated instances, multi-million-dollar checks to Iran 
were followed swiftly by multi million-dollar deposits in the account 
of  the Pahlavi Foundation. Teams from the US General Accounting 
Office were sent to Iran to try to find the schools and hospitals for 
the buildings of  which funds had been specifically allocated [from 
June 1952-June 1963]. The buildings simply didn’t exist.”82 It should 
come to no surprise that while this investigation was under way, aid 
to Iran plummeted, from $53 million in USAID in 1962 to just $2.5 
in 1965.83 The investigation continued until it was finally dropped in 
1967; with continuous pressure from the State Department, Senator 
McClellan finally repudiated the allegations additionally discrediting 
and deporting Khan.84 
In the summer of  1965, after Cook’s article was published in The 
Nation, the Shah traveled to request aid from Canada and France, seeing 
that American funding was reduced so dramatically. While Canadian 
leaders gave the Shah a cold welcome and rejected his request, General 
Charles De Gaulle refused to see him at all. The frustrated Shah 
returned to Tehran for a few days before making an impromptu visit 
to Moscow and signing a long-term credit agreement of  $280 million. 
The Shah’s calculated action likely resulted in a sobering moment for 
President Lyndon Johnson, who restored US-Iranian relations by 
1967, the same year Iran was declared a developed country.85
The scandal only exposed the set of  checks from 1962, but by that 
time aid efforts had been well underway for over ten years. What was 
the extent of  Point Four embezzlement? Although the McClellan 
investigation was not extensively publicized and charges were 
never filed, this influenced USAID’s 1966 exit from Iran more than 
government documents suggest.
irAn: BenefACtor of Aid
The acceptance of  Point Four funds, coupled with other forms of  
aid, had mixed reviews with the Iranian public. In Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s 1962 book, he credits Point Four with modernizing Iran.  “Taken 
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as a whole, the work in Iran has provided us with never-failing aid and 
inspiration in our successful efforts to build a better nation”, the Shah 
explained. “I am happy to recognize that Point Four has helped us 
towards the achievements in agriculture, public health, and industry.”86 
In his book, the Shah communicated his enthusiasm for becoming an 
allied world power with the United States, linking East and West.  
Besides the Shah’s glowing assessment of  Point Four and USAID, 
many articles printed in the 1960s proclaimed that Americans did not 
understand the first thing about Iran. “Why has the Irano-American 
cooperation failed to bring forth expected results? In our opinion, the 
main reason is the Americans’ insufficient and occasionally erroneous 
knowledge about the Iranians’ unique and complicated mentality,” ” 
printed one magazine in 1962. “The road that we have followed on 
your advice, or those of  your advisors, leads nowhere.”87 Another 
article attacks the US more fervently; “Point Four and other aids have 
not been able to turn the immense tide of  this propaganda and to show 
the real motives of  the United States government and the American 
people.”88 In 1960 the enraged former mayor of  Tehran, Arsalan 
Khalatbari, made his voice heard on the floor of  the Majlis. “You have 
imposed upon us four to five hundred advisors at our expense. You 
have raised the costs of  living in our country. Whatever you gave us 
in aid we paid your advisors in salaries. Whatever we imported with 
your aid dollars hurt our own exports.”89 Members of  Iran’s intellectual 
elite, although oppressed, were more outspoken about aid corruption 
and contradiction than American aid officials. 
While the US seemingly helped to modernize Iran in the fields of  
education, agriculture, and public administration, it was not enough 
to appease critics who paid attention to other American actions in 
Iran. In addition to the CIA covert coup of  democratically elected 
Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953, with the Shah’s coaxing of  Majlis 
members the Status of  Forces Agreement was passed in Iran in 1964. 
The Agreement ensured American military personnel immunity from 
Iranian laws. This was controversial in Iran and was cause for many 
protests and growing animosity towards the US, as well as raised 
questions about the Shah’s loyalty. Some accused the Shah of  imposing 
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modernization too swiftly and disrespecting religious and cultural 
traditions along the way.  
In 1976, the Peace Corps withdrew from Iran. The reason for the 
Peace Corps’ exit from Iran was apparently due to the goals of  the 
program had been achieved.90 According to the 1976 national census, 
literacy levels had improved; 58.9% of  males and 35.5% of  females 
above six years old were literate.91 As the focus of  the Peace Corps in 
Iran was raising literacy and most volunteers were assigned to teach, 
surely the Peace Corps contributed to the raise in rates. 
What the reports do not mention, however, is that Iran was supposedly 
deemed no longer eligible for the Peace Corps. Interestingly, precise 
stipulations for a country’s eligibility to host the Peace Corps never had 
existed; it had always been at the discretion of  Peace Corps officials 
with Congressional approval, fluid and subject to change. So if  Peace 
Corps officials or Congress decided to pull the program from Iran, 
why in the mid-1970s? Given Iran’s heightened oil revenues in the mid-
1970s, if  leaders wanted the Peace Corps to continue they would have 
to shoulder the cost. But while government officials welcomed and 
appreciated the Peace Corps in Iran, they were not prepared to pay 
for it out of  pocket. Perhaps the Shah’s suspicions of  the Peace Corps 
contributed to the exit in 1976.
By 1976, 6.6 million barrels of  oil were extracted daily and annual oil 
revenues reached nearly $25 billion.92 Along with Iran’s oil revenues, 
its military too had grown tremendously. By 1976, Iran’s military 
expenditures were the seventh largest in the world.93 Thanks to the 
United States, Iran had seemingly moved up the world’s food chain. In 
1977 Iran was ranked as the largest foreign buyer of  American made 
arms; $5.7 billion worth of  arms purchased in that year alone. Between 
1973 and 1978, Iran acquired over $19 billion worth of  arms from the 
US.94
Other sources dispute the reason for which the Peace Corps left. 
According to Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman’s book, All You Need Is Love: 
the Peace Corps and the Spirit of  the 1960s, the Peace Corps did not leave 
Iran under questions of  funding; Iran asked them to leave. Of  the 
sixteen countries that ever asked the Peace Corps to leave, eleven asked 
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the Peace Corps to return. 95 The Peace Corps has never made the 
choice to leave a country unless volunteers were in serious jeopardy. 
With the exit of  Peace Corps Volunteers, public diplomacy programs 
to Iran were terminated.
tHe fAiLed AmeriCAnizAtion of irAn And tHe isLAmiC revoLution
By some measures the aid work done in Iran between 1951 and 
1976 proved successful. The American aid extension to Iran was an 
American investment in a valuable geopolitical region of  the world, 
commencing at the crucial moment when communism was a looming 
possibility. The Shah ruled Iran in accordance with American interests, 
making Iran an American surrogate in the Persian Gulf. Over the course 
of  the 25-year public diplomacy period, the United States and Iran 
became exceedingly close and interdependent, during which time CIA 
coercion and benevolent aid programs came as an American export 
package. By leaving in 1976, Washington must have been confident 
they built a strong ally of  Iran while preserving oil interests. 
Iranians discontent shattered all illusions of  U.S.-Iranian closeness 
when revolution broke out in 1978, as anti-Shah sentiment exploded. 
Rioters overran the streets, but this time they had not been paid to do 
so by the CIA as was the case in 1953. Despite money and military, the 
Shah fled Iran for Rome in 1979. It was then that Ayatollah Ruhallah 
Khomeini emerged from the shadows of  exile, and returned to Iran. 
The Shah’s monarchy was not a sustainable form of  government. 
Arguably, the Shah’s unchecked power, matched with American 
political and financial support, doomed the regime for failure from 
the beginning. Festering Iranian discontent with the Shah’s abuses of  
power may have made revolution inevitable, but perhaps we can credit 
the revolution’s extremist direction to a reaction against the Shah’s 
attempt at building a façade of  rapid American-prescribed social 
modernization. 
The physical American presence in Iran was noteworthy; between 
1944 and 1979 nearly 1 million Americans visited or lived in Iran. 
In 1977 alone, approximately 50,000 Americans resided in Iran.96 
Besides Foreign Service officers, diplomats, military personnel, 
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and businessmen, American NGO workers, missionaries, tourists, 
academics, Peace Corps volunteers, and aid workers were present, 
filtering in and out of  in Iran during the Cold War.
Iran was the first country to receive Point Four funds, the first to 
experience a CIA orchestrated coup of  a democratically-elected leader, 
the first to teach the United States an important lesson in the corruption 
of  aid funding, and the first to storm the American Embassy, take 
American hostages and chant “Down with the USA” through the 
streets.97 In 1953 the United States had betrayed the Iranian people by 
staging a coup that eliminated the chance of  democratic representation, 
and in 1979 Iranians returned the favor. What lessons can we draw 
from the failed Americanization of  Iran? Perhaps it is a simple one; 
that corruption and contradiction-infused American foreign policies 
may solve short-term problems, but will prove detrimental in the long 
run, and that aid can buy neither friendship nor stability on the popular 
front.
---
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